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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA 
BALDWIN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case NO. 960423-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ADA JONES 
POINT I 
BALDWINS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF THEIR ATTORNEY FEES. 
Baldwins argue in their statement of facts that •• [t]he 
plaintiffs had spent $54,000 (tr. p. 24) compared to $12,000 (tr. 
p. 18) for defendants . . . ." (Baldwin fee brief p. 2.) Baldwins 
repeat this argument on pages 5-6 of their brief. This statement 
is incomplete and therefore misleading. Baldwins presented no 
evidence at the attorney fee hearing. Baldwins' trial attorney 
made a representation to the trial court that his office had 
charged Baldwins approximately $12,000.00. (Fee Tr. 18.) The 
statement was apparently offered for the purpose of showing that 
Jones's attorney fees were unreasonable. Baldwins do not, however, 
give any authority for the proposition that the amount of fees 
incurred by the defense is relevant in deciding whether the 
plaintiff's fees are reasonable. Cabrera v. Cottre11, 694 P.2d 
622, 624-25 (Utah 1985), lists the factors which may be considered 
in fixing a reasonable attorney fee and does not mention this as a 
relevant factor. One would expect that a plaintiff's attorneys 
would be required to spend more effort in a case than defense 
counsel.l 
Even if such a comparative analysis were proper, the cited 
statement, consisting only of the unsworn statement of an attorney, 
was not evidence. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); 
Foxley v. Foxlev. 801 P.2d 155, 157-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
More importantly, even if an attorney's representation as an 
officer of the court were admissible evidence, the statement by 
Baldwins' counsel in this case was not relevant and therefore not 
admissible in any event. At most, the statement only reflected the 
attorney fees Baldwins incurred to their trial counsel during the 
four months immediately preceding trial. The statement omitted any 
reference to the attorney fees incurred to K. L. Mclff, who 
represented Baldwins from the inception of the case through the 
hearing on the first motion for summary judgment and the motion for 
disqualification of the first judge, and likewise did not include 
*In the instant case, for example, plaintiff called four 
witnesses at trial in addition to the parties, including one expert 
who had inspected the property and who had prepared a written 
appraisal report. Defendants called only two non-party witnesses 
who had not already testified for plaintiff. Defendants' "expert" 
had not performed any appraisal, but was apparently presented only 
to testify concerning whether certain factors could affect value. 
(Tr. 448-45 (R. 973-75).) Because plaintiff had more witnesses and 
the testimony of those witnesses was more extensive than those of 
the defendants, one would expect that it would have taken plain-
tiff's attorneys longer to prepare their case. 
2 
the attorney fees incurred to Tex R. Olsen, who represented 
Baldwins at the second summary judgment hearing. (R. 441.) 
Baldwins' trial counsel did not enter an appearance until June 19, 
1995 (R. 484), only five months before trial. If a comparison 
between the plaintiff's and defendants fees is to be made, the 
comparison must be between the plaintiff's entire fee and the 
defendants' entire fee. There was no evidence (nor even a 
representation or proffer) from which the trial court could have 
made such a comparison. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND JONES'S ATTORNEY FEES 
WERE REASONABLE. 
In an attempt to distinguish this case from Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988), Baldwin claims that 
"Plaintiff/appellant's appeal makes no suggestion that there was 
any finding that a fee in excess of the amount awarded was 
reasonable." (Baldwin fee brief p. 4.) This statement is not 
correct; Jones made that very suggestion on pages 9-10 of her 
brief. The trial court expressly found the fees were reasonable: 
"The Court finds that the plaintiffs [sic] incurred attorneys fees 
and costs of $53,990, which includes the $2,000 in expert fees. 
The Court finds that the plaintiffs [sic] were forced to go to 
trial and such a fee is justified." (Fee Tr. 23-24, italics 
added.) The trial court then made an admittedly arbitrary 
reduction because the fee was significantly higher than the value 
3 
of the property. This is exactly the situation presented in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken. 
Baldwins also argue (Baldwins' fee brief p. 5) , as support for 
the $28,990 reduction in fees, that some of the efforts of Jones's 
attorneys were focused on "ongoing business transactions not 
necessary to the litigation.11 Two responses are appropriate. 
First, the legal work was part of the litigation. Baldwins' 
counterclaim included a claim for unlawful detainer. (R. 35-47.) 
Resolving whether and under what conditions Jones could remain on 
the premises was necessary to resolving that claim. Second, the 
trial judge did not identify this very minor, supposedly extraneous 
work as a justification for the trial court's 54% fee reduction; 
the trial court said the amount of the reduction was arbitrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The only reason the trial court reduced Jones's attorney fees 
was that the fees exceeded the amount in controversy. The amount 
of the reduction was arbitrary. The reduction lacked any factual 
basis. This case should be remanded with instructions to award 
Jones the full amount of her requested fees. Jones should also be 
awarded her fees on appeal. 
DATED this 2^SJJ^' day of March, 1997. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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